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SUNRAY DX OIL CO. v. HELMERICH & PAYNE, INC.:
OMISSIONS OF MATERIAL FACTS IN CORPORATE
PROXY STATEMENTS
The impact of federal securities acts on corporate law
and behavior is increasingly being recognized.1 This impact
perhaps is felt most often in situations concerning disclosure
of information by a corporation to its shareholders. The last
few years have seen a tremendous growth in litigation involving dissemination of alledgedly false and misleading information. One reason for this is that more people are investing more money than ever before in corporate securities. As
corporate structures become more and more complex, these
people are watching their investments closer and are demanding greater and more accurate information. Another major
reason for the increase in such litigation is that federal courts
have by interpretations greatly expanded the protection offered investors by the Securities and Exchange Commission
2
rules and regulations.
This article will be concerned with decisions dealing with
one particular source of information which flows from cor1

2

See Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law
of Corporations by Implication Through Rule lOb-5, 49
Nw. U.L. REv. 185 (1964); Shareholder Derivative Suits
Under Sections 10 (b) and 14 (a) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1966); Kaplan, CorporationLaw
and Securities Regulation, 18 Bus. LAw. 868 (1963). 12 U.
Ciu. L.S. RECORD 34 (1964); Lohf, The Corporation Law of
the Securities Acts: Federal Rights of Corporations, 36 U.
COLO. L. REv. 76 (1963).
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that private
parties are afforded a right to relief under the proxy rules.
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). For a discussion
of the impact of the Borak case on federal securities law
see 78 HAIv. L. REv. 1146 (1965) and Shareholder Derivative
Suits Under Sections 10(b) and 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1966).
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poration to shareholder: statements made in proxy solicitations.
The Securities Exchange Act of 19343 authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission to promulgate rules and
regulations which corporations must follow when disclosing
4
information to shareholders and/or prospective shareholders.
The primary purpose of the 1934 Act was to promote fairness
to both sellers and purchasers of securities.5 This purpose
should be borne in mind by any court trying to interpret
the rules under the Act. Rule 14a-9(a) 6 promulgated by the
Commission states in part:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be
made by means of any proxy statement .. . containing any statement which . . . is false or misleading
with respect to any material fact, or which omits to
state any material fact necessary in order to make
the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a
proxy ....
A recent case construing, or perhaps misconstruing, this
rule was decided by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The case, Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc.T,
provides an excellent starting point for a discussion of Rule
14a-9.
In January of 1968, Sunray announced to its stockholders
a proposed merger agreement with Sun Oil Company. In
February of 1968, Sunray and its associates were successful bidders on an off-shore tract in the Santa Barbara channel
3 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1934).
4 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1934).
S. REP. No. 792, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1934).
C 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (a) (1968).
7 398 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1968).
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with a bid of $38,380,032.00.8 The Santa Barbara property was
designated as Tract 401. Union Oil Company was the successful bidder for the lease on Tract 402, which adjoined Tract
401, with a bid of $61,418,000.00. 9 Union Oil Company commenced drilling soon thereafter and on March 19 announced
that it had made a "major oil discovery" in the first well
drilled upon Tract 402.10 On March 19 and 20, Sunray mailed
to each of its stockholders a notice of a stockholder's meeting to vote on the merger and solicited voting proxies from
those stockholders unable to a t t e n d the meeting. One
week before the proposed stockholder meeting, Helmerich & Payne, Inc., Sunray's largest single shareholder, corn8 This bid was $6,000,000.00 in excess of the previous high bid
for an offshore lease. Sunray acquired a 3212% interest in
the lease amounting to $12,500,000.00. Brief for appellant at
2, 5, Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 398
F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1968).
This was the largest single bid in history for an offshore
lease. Brief for Appellant, supra note 8, at 5.
10 Union Oil Company press release dated March 19, 1968,
stated that:
Union Oil Company of California announced today it has
made a major oil discovery in the first well drilled on
a lease acquired in the recent Federal offshore Santa
Barbara Channel land sale. On test, the discovery well
in Block 402, OCS P-0241 No. 2, flowed at a rate of 1,800
barrels per day of 27.8 degree gravity crude oil through
a I/z inch bean. Total depth of the well is 3,775 feet. The
well encountered in excess of 1,000 net feet of oil sand.
The sands being tested lie between 2,000 and 2,700 feet
deep. Tests of other sands are planned. Union is operator
for itself, Gulf Oil Corporation, Mobil Oil Corporation
and Texaco, Inc. A second well on the block, OCS P0241 No. 1 is drilling at approximately 3,500 feet. This
well, which already has passed through 1,500 feet of oil
sand, will be bottomed below 10,000 feet. Two 60-well
drilling platforms have been ordered for installation on
Block 402.
Brief for Appellant at 4, Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Helmerich
& Payne, Inc., 398 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1968).
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menced an action alleging that Sunray's failure to advise its
stockholders of facts concerning Tract 401 and the information contained in the Union press release was a material
omission from its proxy material."
In order to make out a cause of action under Rule 14a-9
it is necessary to establish four items:
12
1. That a "solicitation" was made;
2. That it contained an untrue statement or an omission
of fact;
3. That the fact omitted or misrepresented was material;
and
4. That the untrue statement or omission of fact was
misleading. 3
In the majority of cases concerning operation of Rule
14a-9, a problem arises in determining what is or is not a
material fact. Decisions have fairly well established a material
fact as one which, if known by an ordinary stockholder, would
be expected to influence his vote.14 This broad test of materiality is obviously developed from the definition of "mateHelmerich & Payne, Inc. owned 616,000 shares of Sunray
common stock which represented an investment of $21,500,000.00. Brief for Appellant, supra note 10, at 5.
12 See Rule 14a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 (1968) defining "solicitation".
13 The requirement that a proxy solicitation be misleading is
expressed disjunctively from the requirement that it be
false. However, only false statements that are also misleading should be prohibited. Of course, there is no requirement
for falsity with respect to an omission of a fact. There, the
only consideration is the materiality of the fact.
14 See Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Evans v. Armour & Co., 241 F. Supp. 705 (E.D. Pa. 1965);
Western Oil Fields, Inc. v. McKnab, 232 F. Supp. 162 (D.
Colo. 1964); Bresnick v. Home Title & Guar. Co., 175
F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Dunn v. Decca Records, 120
F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
"
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rial" in the field of tort law. 1 For the most part, courts have
failed to draw any guidelines beyond this broad definition
as to what constitutes a material f a c t under certain circumstances.' In the Sunray case, the stockholder attempted
to show that such an omission was material by introducing
evidence to show that the amount of oil reserves on Tract 401
was substantial when compared with Sunray's present proven
reserves. 17 Comparisons also were made with respect to profits
expected from the acquisition of such a lease. Basically, the
shareholder's argument was that since the information as to
the tremendous potential of Tract 401 was not known, and
indeed, the lease was not even acquired until after the terms
of the proposed merger agreement were announced, the value
of this tract was given no consideration in determining the
exchange rate for the proposed merger. The plaintiff contended that had the stockholders had the information concerning
Tract 401 and Tract 402, they might have considered the exchange rate as an undervaluation of their shares and therefore would have refused to give their proxies to the management to vote for the merger.
15 "A fact is material if its existence or nonexistence is a matter to which a reasonable man would attach importance in
determining his choice of action in the transaction in question, or the maker of the representation knows that its
recipient is likely to regard the fact as important although
a reasonable man would not so regard it." RESTATEMIENT
OF TORTS § 538 (1965).
16 But See, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968), for a rather detailed discussion of the concept
of a "material fact" with respect to the operation of Rule
10b-5.
17 The trial court had evidence before it to find the probable
reserves of Sunray's 32 % interest to be anywhere from
45,760,000 barrels, as a minimum, to 234,000,000 barrels, as
a maximum, and that this tract would add anywhere from
10.5%, as a minimum, to 54%, as a maximum, to Sunray's
total domestic proven oil reserves. Brief for Appellee at 2,
4, 9, Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 348
F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1968).
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The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the
District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma and
found that no violation of the proxy rules had occurred. The
court's basis seems to be that since the amount of oil reserves
under Tract 401 could not be definitely ascertained, it could
not be considered a material fact which should be disclosed to
shareholders in a proxy statement. The court noted that since
the reserves were merely "probable" and not "proved", any
mention of them would be misleading to "any investor other
than one who is an expert in the industry."' 8 The court appears to be suggesting that the average investor does not possess the mental capacity to intelligently analyze the effect of
various factors on the value of his stock. While this may or
may not be true, he would certainly be in a better position to
so analyze if he were at least made aware of these factors before being asked to exchange his stock in a proposed merger
agreement. The court fails to discuss the definition of "material" with respect to the factual situation at hand. They have
seemed to place the emphasis on whether or not the reserves
were "proved" or "probable" from the company's point of view.
Referring to the prior definition of material, it can be seen that
the emphasis should be placed on the shareholder's point of
view, and the consideration should be whether or not the
shareholder would classify the information important enough
to influence his vote. If the r e a s o n a b 1 e shareholder
would classify the information about Union's adjoining tract
as this important, then it should be immaterial whether or
not the reserves under Sunray's tract should be technically
referred to as "proved" or "probable". The information concerning Sunray's tract which might properly be termed as
conjecture need not have even been presented to Sunray's
stockholders. The known facts concerning only Union's adjoining tract should have been deemed material information requiring disclosure to Sunray's shareholders.
18 Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 398 F.2d
447, 451 (10th Cir. 1968).
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A case recently decided by the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit discussed at some length the concept of "material", and that decision appears to conflict with the decision
in the Sunray case. The case of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co. was an action concerning violations of Rule 10b-5.19
This rule concerns the purchase or sale of securities by
"insiders" who possess certain information not y e t available to the general public. However, contained in Rule 10b-5
there is language relative to the omission of a material fact
20
which is nearly identical to the language used in Rule 14a-9.
One issue the court was called upon to resolve was the materiality of certain information possessed by employees of the
defendant company. The information concerned the results
of drill core tests obtained during exploratory work in connection with the search for commercially mineable ore. The
ore deposits were what the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit would term as "probable" and not yet "proved". As a
matter of fact, the trial court concluded that the results of
the drill core were "too remote . . .to have had any significant impact on the market, i.e. to be deemed material." 21
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with
this finding stating that the word "material" encompasses any
fact "'which in reasonable and objective contemplation
might affect the value of the corporation's stock or securities.' "322
The court went on to say that "material facts include
not only information disclosing the earnings and distributions
of a company, but also those facts which affect the desire of
19 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
20 Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (b) (1968) provides in part
that it shall be unlawful for any person "to make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made .. . not misleading."
21 258 F. Supp. 262, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
22 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir.
1968).
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investors to buy, sell, or hold the company's securities." 23
This concept of a "material fact" as used in Rule 10b-5 arguably should not be different from that used in Rule 14a-9. It
would seem that any fact considered material if within the
knowledge of an "insider" trading in the securities would
likewise be considered material if not disclosed to a shareholder in a proxy solicitation. The investor needs to be made
aware of information which might affect the value of the
company's securities, not only when he goes to purchase those
securities, but also when he is asked to exchange them in a
merger agreement. The injustice which might possibly result from a corporation's withholding information when soliciting proxies is certainly as great as that injustice resulting
from an "insider's" trading on the basis of not yet publicized
information. Therefore, the standard determining a "material
fact" should be the same for both situations. If the purpose
of the Exchange Act is truly to "promote fairness to both
sellers and purchasers of securities", 24 this purpose would
seem to be better served by the interpretation the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit gives to the word "material"
than that given it by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
In Sunray, the court noted that the Securities and Exchange Commission had "approved" the proxy material before
it was sent to the stockholders. 25 The decision seemed to indicate that because of this "approval" the proxy material was
found by the Commission to be true and accurate and not to be
false or misleading. The court also indicated weight should be
given to the fact that the Commission had not taken action to
prevent the use of such material. 26 In reality, neither of these
positions is tenable, and the Commission itself has disagreed
23Id.

S. REP. No. 792, supra note 5.
Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 398 F.2d
447, 449 (10th Cir. 1968).
26 Id. at 452.
24
25
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with both of them. Indeed, Rule 14a-9 (b),27 promulgated by
the Commission, specifically provides:
[T]he fact that a proxy statement, form of proxy
or other soliciting material has been filed with or
examined by the Commission shall not be deemed
a finding by the Commission that such material is
accurate or complete or not false or misleading, or
that the Commission has passed upon the merits of
or approved any statement contained therein or any
matter to be acted upon by security holders.
As to the second position, there are reasons wholly apart
from any considerations of the accuracy or completeness of
the material contained in proxy statements which might explain the Commission's failure to bring an action of its own
in any particular case. The Supreme Court, in discussing these
reasons, has said:
The Commission advises that it examines over 2,000
proxy statements annually and each of them must
necessarily be expedited. Time does not permit an independent examination of the facts set out in the
proxy material and this results in the Commission's
acceptance of the representations contained therein
at their face value, unless contrary to other material
on file with it. 28
This would seem even more applicable in the c a s e
of an omission as opposed to a false statement. In the latter
case the Commission might have opportunity to discover
the inaccuracy of an affirmative statement, while in the former case it would be nearly impossible to carefully check each
proxy solicitation for omissions. Once a violation of the proxy
rules is alleged, the court should make an objective inquiry
into such allegation, and the fact that the Commission previously has examined such material should be given no weight
whatsoever. Despite the positions taken by the Commission
and the Supreme Court, lower federal courts continue to point
27
28

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (b) (1968).
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
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out the fact that the Commission has not taken any action
to prevent the use of such material. 29 It would therefore seem
that a violation of Rule 14a-9 is more likely to be found to have
occurred when the Securities and Exchange Commission is
the plaintiff in the action as opposed to when a private party
is seeking enforcement of the provision. Such a result is extremely undesirable, and the courts should make every effort to see that this does not come about.
Confusion concerning operation of Rule 14a-9 is by no
means limited to determining what is or is not a material
fact. In J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, ° the Supreme Court determined that private parties have a right to bring suit for violations of S.E.C. proxy rules. But the lower courts have been
in disagreement over which private parties may maintain such
an action. For example, should misrepresentations give rise
to a cause of action only to shareholders who gave proxies to
management in reliance upon such misrepresentations? Or
should any shareholder be able to complain of such deception in proxy solicitations? The first of the two interpretations
seems to be inconsistent with the federal policy of investor
protection, for those most likely to be duped would seem least
likely to discover the fact of their deception, and those not
personally misled are still apt to suffer injury from such misrepresentations. Therefore, more effective protection would
be achieved if any shareholder could complain of deception
in proxy solicitations. 31
The courts also have struggled with application of proxy
29

See Mack v. Mishkin, 172 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
Sherman v. Posner, 266 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Shvetz
v. Industrial Rayon Corp., 212 F. Supp. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).

30

377 U.S. 426 (1964).

31

For a discussion of the merits of permitting only persons
actually misled to bring suit for violation of Rule 14a, see
Comment, Private Actions and the Proxy Rules: The Basis
and the Breadth of the Federal Remedy, 35 U. CI. L. REv.
328, 341-44 (1964); 51 IowA L. REV. 515 (1966).
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rules to minority stockholders. There generally has been some
feeling that the rules should not be applied as strictly against
minority stockholders as they should when the misrepresentation is made by management. This theory was expressed
by Judge Rifkind:
Furthermore, it is a letter by a minority stockholder
in opposition to the management. That factor does
not constitute a license to lie but it does afford the
reasonable expectation that under-statement or exaggeration will be answered-a condition not always
reviewed
to be anticipated when the communication
32
issues from the management.

Neither Congress nor the Commission has seen fit to exempt a minority shareholder from the operation of the proxy
rules, and for the courts to attempt to do so would seem to
be a judicial infringement upon the legislative province. This
reasoning by courts places a heavy burden upon management
to reply to false statements made in the proxy material of
minority shareholders. Logic dictates that the company should
have rights equal to the rights of any minority shareholder
under proxy rules. It should be of no concern to the courts
whether misrepresentations were made by management or by
a minority shareholder. The minority shareholder who uses
false statements in solicitations of proxies should not escape
the operation of Rule 14a-9 merely because the management
might see fit to reply to such statements.
With respect to a related issue, at least one court has
held that no matter from which source the misleading statements originate, if the shareholders are actually informed of
the true facts from any other source, a cause of action should
not lie under Rule 14a-9.33 Such reasoning defies explanation
since the test is whether the statement itself contains mateSEC v. Okin, 48 F. Supp. 928, 930 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), affd,
137 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1943).
33 See Bresnick v. Home Title Guar. Co., 175 F. Supp. 723
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
32
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rial omissions or false information and not whether the shareholders are actually misled after considering all the information at their disposal.
The final question presented here with respect to the
problem of which private parties have standing under the
proxy rules concerns the situation in which the defendant
owns more than enough stock to carry any proposed resolution. In such a situation the defendant argues that since misrepresentations will have no effect on the outcome of the
voting, the plaintiffs should not be allowed to maintain such
an action. In 1965 the District Court for the Southern District
of New York upheld this ridiculous contention in the case of
Barnett v. Anaconda Co. 3 4 The court granted a motion to dismiss because the defendant owned seventy-three percent of
the stock. One year later the District Court for the Eastern
District of New York completely disagreed with the result
reached in the Barnett case. In Laurenzano v. H. Einbender3 5
the court criticized the Barnett decision, saying:
The meeting does not become nugatory and dispensable because one stockholder owns enough shares to
carry any resolution and can be expected to vote in
favor of his own resolutions ....

The meeting must

be held and the stockholders must receive a truthful proxy statement3
Thus inconsistent definitions of "a material fact" have
been given by the various circuit courts of appeals and by
district courts within the same circuit. Such inconsistency
makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a shareholder to confidently rely on past judicial decisions in this area of the
law. Federal courts need to develop uniform guidelines concerning operation of the securities rules so that the congressional purpose of investor protection will be carried out. These
guidelines should be liberally drawn so that the class of in238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
31 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
88 Id. at 362.
34
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